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THE NBA'S AGE REQUIREMENT SHOOTS AND
MISSES: HOW THE NON-STATUTORY
EXEMPTION PRODUCES INEQUITABLE
RESULTS FOR HIGH SCHOOL BASKETBALL
STARS
Brian Shaffer*
I. INTRODUCTION
The cameras flash as Michael Jordan jukes his defender
and jumps to take the shot. The crowd is going wild, doing its
best to distract Jordan and prevent him from delivering
another game winning basket. The ball leaves Jordan's
hands and elegantly slips into the hoop, giving Jordan and
the Chicago Bulls another NBA championship.1 These are
the moments that boys and girls dream of when they are
shooting hoops in their driveway. Very few, however, have
the skills and determination to make these dreams come true.
Bill Walker certainly had these types of aspirations.
Walker was a high school basketball phenom at North
College Hill High School in Cincinnati, Ohio.2 He teamed
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1. See NBA.com, Michael Jordan, Career Retrospective,
http://www.nba.com/jordan/mjfinals.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). Jordan
made a jump shot with 5.2 seconds remaining in the fourth quarter of game six
to lead the Chicago Bulls to the 1998 NBA Championship against the Utah
Jazz. See id.
2. See Rodger Bohn, O.J. Mayo and Bill Walker: High School Phenoms,
DRAFT EXPRESS, Apr. 8, 2005,
http://www.draftexpress.com/viewarticle.php?a=149.
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with O.J. Mayo' to comprise one of the most talented tandems
in the state of Ohio.4 Walker's dreams of playing in the
National Basketball Association (NBA) were within his
sights, as many scouting agencies predicted that he would be
a high selection in the NBA draft after his senior season.5
However, Walker soon found out that his entry into the NBA
would be temporarily delayed. In the summer of 2005, the
NBA and the National Basketball Players Association
(NBPA) agreed to a collective bargaining agreement 6 (CBA)
that instituted eligibility restrictions on players entering the
league.' The new rules required players entering the league
to be both nineteen years old and at least one year removed
from their high school graduation.8
Walker received more bad news. The Ohio High School
Athletic Association declared him ineligible to play on his
high school team because he had already played eight
semesters of high school basketball.9 With the NBA off the
table, Walker accelerated his high school curriculum and
graduated early.1" He enrolled at Kansas State University
and the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
declared him eligible to play in the 2006-2007 season."
Walker made an instant impact with Kansas State, leading
the team to important victories over the University of
3. Most pundits agree that Mayo is even more talented than Walker and
predict that Mayo will be a very high draft pick when he becomes eligible. See
id.
4. See id.
5. See Howard Richman, Injury Brings New Spin to Bill Walker's World,
KAN. CITY STAR, Jan. 10, 2007, at D1.
6. "[C] ollective bargaining means the performance of the mutual obligation
of the representative of an agency and the exclusive representative of employees
in an appropriate unit in the agency to meet at reasonable times and to consult
and bargain in a good-faith effort to reach agreement with respect to the
conditions of employment affecting such employees and to execute, if requested
by either party, a written document incorporating any collective bargaining
agreement reached, but the obligation referred to in this paragraph does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or to make a concession." 5 U.S.C. §
7103(a)(12) (2006).
7. See NBA Player's Association, NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement
Art. X: Player Eligibility and NBA Draft, available at
http://www.nbpa.com/cba-articles/article-X.php [hereinafter, NBA, Article X].
8. Id.
9. See Andy Katz, Walker's Season Comes to an End with Ruptured ACL,
ESPN.cOM, Jan. 9, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=2724691.
10. See id.
11. See id.
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Southern California and the University of New Mexico. 12
Walker was third on the team in scoring at 11.3 points per
game, and second in rebounding at 4.5 per game. 13
Then disaster struck. On January 6, 2007, in a game at
Texas A & M, Walker ruptured the anterior cruciate ligament
(ACL) in his left knee. 14 He underwent surgery and faced an
arduous six to eight month rehabilitation period. 15 Given the
nature of the injury, it is questionable if Walker will ever
return to his previous form. 6
Walker arguably had the skills to play in the NBA, yet
the NBA's new age requirement forced him to play elsewhere
until the age of nineteen and until one year had passed since
his high school graduation. 7 Under the old rule, Walker
could have entered the NBA directly from high school and
made millions of dollars.8 Now these millions could be gone,
and Walker may never have another opportunity to realize
this level of success.
The unfortunate story of Bill Walker has led some
experts to speculate that there will be a legal challenge to the
NBA's age requirement.19 The most likely challenge will be
that the rule violates federal antitrust laws. 2° This comment
analyzes the potential for success of such a challenge and
questions whether the current state of the law provides an
equitable solution when applied to the NBA. Part II details
the explosion of high school basketball players entering the
NBA2' and outlines arguments for and against the age
limitation. 22 This section also provides a background in the
applicable antitrust and labor principles that form the
current state of the law.23 Additionally, it explains how the
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See Katz, supra note 9.
16. See generally Jonathan Cluett, M.D., Information About Interior
Cruciate Ligament Injuries (Jan. 17, 2005),
http://orthopedics.about.com/cs/aclrepain/a/acl.htm.
17. NBA, Article X, supra note 7.
18. See Richman, supra note 5.
19. See Blair Clarkson, NBA's Minimum Age Likely Will Face Lawsuits,
DAILY J., June 30, 2005, at 1.
20. See id.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part II.
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Second and Eighth Circuits have handled similar cases,
including the recent decision in Clarett v. NFL,24 and details
the differing legal tests that these circuits utilize.2 5 Part III
outlines the specific legal question answered in this
comment.26 Part IV analyzes the chances for success of an
antitrust suit challenging the NBA age requirement and
concludes that, given the current state of the law, the
challenge would likely fail.27  Finally, Part V discusses the
inequities in the current law and outlines a solution to resolve
these issues.28
II. BACKGROUND
A. From the Prom to the NBA: The Rise of the High School
Player in the NBA
Prior to the 1990s, high school players entering the NBA
were a relatively rare phenomenon.29 The 1990s, however,
saw an explosion of high school talent entering the NBA. °
This trend began in 1995 when the Minnesota Timberwolves
drafted Kevin Garnett from Farragut Academy High School
in Illinois.3' Over the next nine years, several other high
school players were drafted into the NBA, including Kobe
Bryant,32  Tracy McGrady,3 3 Jermaine O'Neal, 34  LeBron
24. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See infra Part V.
29. See Andrew M. Jones, Comment, Hold the Mayo: An Analysis of the
Validity if the NBA's Stern No Preps to Pros Rule and the Application of the
Nonstatutory Exemption, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 475, 478 (2006). The most
prominent pre-90s high school player was Moses Malone, who guided the
Philadelphia 76ers to the 1983 NBA Championship and was later inducted into
the NBA Hall of Fame. See NBA.com, NBA Encyclopedia Playoff Edition,
Moses Malone, http://www.nba.com/history/players/malonemsuimmary.html
(last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
30. See Jones, supra note 29, at 478-79.
31. Id.
32. See NBA.com, Kobe Bryant Bio Page,
http://www.nba.com/playerfile/kobe-bryant/bio.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
33. See NBA.com, Tracy McGrady Bio Page,
http://www.nba.com/playerfile/tracy-mcgrady/bio.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2008).
34. See NBA.com, Jermaine O'Neal Bio Page,
http://www.nba.com/playerfile/jermaineoneal/bio.html (last visited Feb. 15,
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James,35 and Amare Stoudamire.36 All of these players have
become top-flight NBA All-Stars and are the faces of the
league today.
Unfortunately, not all high school players that enter the
NBA draft are guaranteed riches and success. For example,
the Detroit Pistons drafted Korleone Young out of Hargrave
Military Academy in Virginia with the fortieth pick in the
1998 NBA draft.37 He played in only three games and was
later released by Detroit because of an injury. 8 Young has
not played in the NBA since. 9 Leon Smith is another
cautionary tale for high school players making the jump to
the NBA. The San Antonio Spurs drafted Smith with the
twenty-ninth pick in the 1999 draft.40 Smith was plagued by
behavioral and legal problems and was released before the
end of his first year in the league.41 He is a prime example of
a player who lacked the maturity to handle the pressure and
responsibility of life in professional sports.
B. Go to College Young Man: Arguments in Favor of the Age
Limit
Proponents of the age limit assert that it will be
beneficial for the NBA, its fans, and the prospective players
entering the league.42 First, the rule is beneficial to the NBA
2008).
35. See NBA.com, LeBron James Bio Page,
http://www.nba.com/playerfile/lebronjames/bio.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2008).
36. See NBA.com, Amare Stoudemire Bio Page,
http://www.nba.com/playerfile/amare-stoudemire/bio.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2008).
37. See Rivals.com, High School Players and the NBA Draft,
http:l/ssbasketball.rivals.com/content.asp?SID=1132&CID=356192 (last visited
Feb. 15, 2008).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. See id. The many behavioral and legal problems suffered by Smith
include: throwing a rock through a car window, swallowing 250 aspirin pills,
being placed in a psychiatric ward, allegedly threatening his ex-girlfriend with a
gun, and ramming his car into his ex-girlfriend's mother's car. Leon Smith
Checks Out of Hospital, Looks to Future, CNN SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 7,
2007,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/basketball/nba/news/2000/01/O7/smith-update-
ap/.
42. See Kevin J. Cimino, Comment, The Rebirth of the NBA - Well, Almost:
An Analysis of the Maurice Clarett Decision and Its Impact on the National
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and its fans because the age limit will preserve the jobs of
veteran players and will lead to better quality of play and a
more exciting product.43 The NBA has declined in popularity
in recent years and many attribute this trend to younger
players who lack fundamental basketball skills and
maturity.4 Second, the rule can benefit prospective players
as the age limit will force many of the top high school players
to enroll in college for at least one year,45 thereby increasing
the quality of play in college basketball. 6 A year in college
will also provide time to develop and mature in a college
setting and will prepare the players for the everyday rigors of
being a professional athlete.47 Additionally, the new age limit
will curtail the prevalence of NBA scouts at high school gyms
and Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) tournaments.48 Under
the old rule, top players were exposed to NBA scouts as early
as age fourteen. 49 Finally, the age limit may prevent players
from throwing away what might be their only opportunity at
a college education.50
C. Money, Money, Money: Arguments Against the Age Limit
Opponents of the age limit claim that it is unfair to high
school players who have the talent to succeed in the NBA.51
First, the age limit restricts a player's ability to use his skills
and talents to earn a living.52 The average NBA lottery pick
will make $1.6 million per year, plus countless more in
endorsement contracts.5 3 If a player chooses to play in the
NBA Developmental League (NBDL) or in Europe until he
Basketball Association, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 831,861 (2006).
43. See id. at 864 (comparing the results of the NFL's age eligibility rule to
the prospective result in the NBA).
44. See id. at 865.
45. See id. at 869.
46. See id. at 869-70.
47. See Jones, supra note 29, at 479.
48. "The Amateur Athletic Union is one of the largest, non-profit volunteer
sports organizations in the United States. A multi-sport organization, the AAU
is dedicated exclusively to the promotion and development of amateur sports
and physical fitness programs." Amateur Athletic Union,
http://www.aausports.org/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
49. Cimino, supra note 42, at 870.
50. Id. at 864.
51. See id. at 862.
52. See id.
53. Clarkson, supra note 19.
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meets league eligibility requirements, he will only earn an
average of $20,000 to $75,000.11 Second, these players run
the risk of suffering significant injuries that may end their
basketball careers.55 Injuries may cost high school players
millions of dollars, as the NBA is one of a few unique career
paths with a potential for a million dollar salary. Third,
many of the educational benefits of attending college are lost
when an athlete leaves for the NBA after only one year of
school. Finally, if NBA teams are worried about the quality
of their product and their image, they can simply choose not
to draft high school players.56 It does not make sense to
completely close the door to players like LeBron James, who
clearly benefit the game, the league, and the fans. 7
D. Article X Marks the Spot: The End of the High School
Player in the NBA
After years of advocating for an age requirement, NBA
commissioner David Stern reached a new CBA with NBPA in
2005.5 Article X, the draft eligibility provision, requires:
[T]he player (A) is or will be at least 19 years of age during
the calendar year in which the Draft is held, and (B) with
respect to a player who is not an international player ....
at least one NBA season has elapsed since the player's
graduation from high school (or, if the player did not
graduate from high school, since the graduation of the
class with which the player would have graduated had he
graduated from high school).... ."
This provision ushered in a new era of NBA basketball to
the detriment of talented high school players. Several
commentators have suggested that an antitrust challenge to
Article X will be forthcoming.6 ° The next sections discuss the
background and legal validity of such a challenge.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. See Jones, supra note 29, at 480.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 476.
59. NBA, Article X, supra note 7.
60. See Clarkson, supra note 19.
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E. As Clear As Mud: The Intersection of Antitrust and
Federal Labor Law
In order to fully assess a possible challenge to Article X of
the CBA, one must understand the interplay between
antitrust and federal labor law.6' Confusion, rather than
clarity, characterizes the intersection of these broad areas of
law.62  On one hand, antitrust law aims to prevent
unreasonable restraints on trade.63 On the other hand, labor
law encourages unionization, which prevents workers from
individually contracting with employers, and thus may
restrain trade.64  The discussion below details how courts
have carefully navigated this tension by creating exceptions
to antitrust law for certain labor-related activities.
1. Antitrust Law: The Defender of Free Trade
The Sherman Antitrust Act provides the basis for an
antitrust suit.65 The Act was originally passed in order to
curtail the exploitation of economic power by major industrial
trusts and railroad companies.66 Section One of the Act
declares illegal "[e]very contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States."67 The party asserting an antitrust violation
must prove (1) a concerted action between the defendant and
a third party, (2) a restraint on trade, and (3) an effect on
foreign or interstate commerce.68 Due to the broad language
of the Act, courts have formulated two tests to determine if
the above elements are satisfied: the rule of reason and the
per se rule.69
Under the rule of reason, a court must conduct a complex
and detailed analysis of (1) the facts of the business involved,
(2) the nature of the restraint, (3) the condition of the
business before and after the restraint, and (4) the real and
61. See Jones, supra note 29, at 478.
62. See Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
63. See Jones, supra note 29, at 488.
64. See id. at 490.
65. See Nicholas E. Wurth, Comment, The Legality of an Age-Requirement
in the National Basketball League After the Second Circuit's Decision in Clarett
v. NFL, 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 106 (2005).
66. Cimino, supra note 42, at 835.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
68. Cimino, supra note 42, at 835.
69. Id. at 835-36.
688 [Vo1:48
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potential benefits of the restraint.70 In short, if the benefits of
the agreement outweigh the restraints on trade, then the
agreement is permitted.71
The per se rule is an alternative to the difficult and time
consuming rule of reason analysis. Acting out of concern for
judicial economy, the Supreme Court has concluded that
certain activities are per se illegal.72 These activities include
price fixing, tying arrangements, horizontal market divisions,
and group boycotts.73  In essence, these arrangements
inherently violate antitrust law and no further analysis is
required.
2. Federal Labor Law: The Defender of Unions and
Collective Bargaining
Federal labor law favors unionization of workers because,
theoretically, a union is able to negotiate the best deal for its
members.74  Unionization, however, reduces competition
because individuals cannot independently negotiate for
certain terms of their employment and therefore serves as a
restraint on trade.75 To combat these seemingly contradictory
preferences, two exemptions exist that allow unions to legally
operate within antitrust prohibitions: the statutory and non-
statutory exemptions."
The statutory exemption emerged from the Clayton Act of
1914.77  The Act exempted organized labor from antitrust
analysis if the organized labor did not deviate from its
legitimate purpose. 78 The Norris-LaGuardia Act 79 followed the
Clayton Act and expressed a clear preference for organized
labor by, for example, stripping federal court jurisdiction for
70. Jones, supra note 29, at 488 & n.133 (citing Bd. of Trade of City of
Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918)).
71. Cimino, supra note 42, at 836 & n.36 (citing Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)).
72. See Wurth, supra note 65, at 106.
73. Jones, supra note 29, at 489.
74. See id. at 490.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Id.; see also Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006); see also Jones, supra note 29, at 490.
79. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-115 (2006)).
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cases involving labor disputes."0  The National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 soon followed and set forth a federal
policy promoting collective bargaining on wages, hours, and
other working conditions.8 '
Despite the seemingly broad reach of the statutory
exemption, it only extends to labor activities that are
unilaterally undertaken by a union.82 It does not extend to
joint actions, negotiations, or agreements between unions and
non-labor groups.8 3 Recognizing that an additional exception
was needed to navigate the conflicting congressional policies
favoring both competition and collective bargaining, the
Supreme Court created the non-statutory exemption to
exempt certain union-employer agreements from antitrust
scrutiny. 4
The non-statutory exception excludes agreements
between employers and unions from antitrust analysis so long
as the agreement arises "in a labor market characterized by
collective bargaining."" Collective bargaining is the process
of negotiation between representatives of a union and
employers regarding the terms and conditions of
employment.8 6 If the collective bargaining is not shielded by
the non-statutory exemption, then a court is free to apply
antitrust law by using the rule of reason or per se analysis.
The non-statutory exemption protects the fruits of
collective bargaining if the actions taken pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement do not violate federal labor
laws. 8 The U.S. Supreme Court first dealt with the non-
statutory exemption in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3,
80. See Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prod., Inc., 311
U.S. 91, 101-03 (1940).
81. See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)).
82. Mackey v. Nat'l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1976).
83. Id. Since the CBA was a collaborative negotiation, not a unilateral
action, the statutory exemption would not extend to the CBA between the NBA
and the NBPA.
84. See id. at 611-12.
85. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 134 n.14 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Mid
America Reg'l Bargaining Ass'n v. Will County Carpenters Dist. Council, 675
F.2d 881, 893 (7th Cir. 1982)).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
87. Jones, supra note 29, at 492.
88. See id.
690 [Vol:48
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International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. 9 Here, the
Court held that the non-statutory exemption does not apply
where unions "combine with employers and manufacturers..
. to restrain competition."90 In United Mine Workers of
America v. Pennington,9' a miners' union agreed with a large
coal corporation that the union would demand higher wages
from smaller coal operators in an attempt to drive the smaller
operators out of the market.92 The Court held that the non-
statutory exemption does not apply when a union agrees to
impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units.93 In
Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
Union No. 100,94 the Court further defined the non-statutory
exemption by holding that federal labor policy provides no
protection when unions conspire with non-labor groups to
obstruct competition.95
The Supreme Court has also addressed the non-statutory
exemption in the context of professional sports. In Brown v.
Pro Football, Inc.,96 a group of NFL practice squad players
brought an antitrust suit against the NFL team owners.97
After negotiations over salary had reached an impasse, the
NFL unilaterally implemented a weekly salary.9  The
practice players asserted that the agreement was a restraint
on trade and violated antitrust laws.99 The Court held that
the non-statutory exemption applied and ruled in favor of the
NFL. 100 Reasoning that various federal labor laws allow
employers to take actions after an impasse, the NFL owners'
actions were supported by federal labor policy.'0 ' The Court
also held that the non-statutory exception is not limited only
89. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S.
797 (1945).
90. Id. at 798.
91. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
92. See id. at 660.
93. See id. at 665.
94. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,
421 U.S. 616 (1975).
95. Id. at 622-23.
96. Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
97. Id. at 233-34.
98. Id. at 235.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 250.
101. See id. at 245.
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to the agreements contained in a CBA. 112 Finally, the Court
stated that while athletes have a unique and valuable skill
set, they are indistinguishable from other organized workers
under federal labor law. 
10 3
F. A Tale of Two Tests: The Second and Eighth Circuits and
the Non-Statutory Exemption
A challenge to Article X of the CBA will undoubtedly
center on the non-statutory exemption. Since the CBA was a
product of collective bargaining, the NBA and the NBPA will
likely assert that the non-statutory exemption shields the age
limitation from antitrust analysis.0 4
The precise scope of the non-statutory exemption,
however, is unclear because it is judicially created.0 ° Thus,
in order to accurately predict the outcome of an antitrust
challenge to Article X, it is necessary to look at how federal
courts have interpreted and applied the non-statutory
exemption in past challenges to collective bargaining
agreements. Most of these cases originated in the Second and
Eighth Circuits and two competing tests have emerged. 10 6
This section explores these tests and discusses the rationale
behind the recent decision in Clarett v. NFL.
1. The Eighth Circuit and Mackey: A Three Pronged
Attack
Mackey v. NFL10 7 was one of the first cases to deal with
the non-statutory exemption in the professional sports
context. A group of current and former NFL players sued the
NFL, alleging that the "Rozelle Rule" violated the Sherman
Antitrust Act. 08 The "Rozelle Rule" stated that if a player
signs a contract with a different team after his current
contract expired, the new team was required to pay the
former team compensation. 19 If an agreement between the
102. Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996).
103. See id. at 248-50.
104. See Cimino, supra note 42, at 858-59.
105. Jones, supra note 29, at 492.
106. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976); see also Clarett v.
NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 138 (2d Cir. 2004).
107. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
108. See id. at 609.
109. See id. at 609 n.1.
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two teams was not reached, the NFL commissioner could
intervene and award players or draft picks to the former
team."' This cumbersome rule caused teams to hesitate
before signing free agents and thus severely restricted the
free movement of players between teams.11' The players
alleged that the rule was an illegal restraint on trade because
it denied the players the right to freely contract for their
services.112
The Eighth Circuit formulated a three-part test to
determine if the non-statutory exemption precluded federal
antitrust analysis." 3 To determine if the non-statutory
exemption would apply, the court considered whether: (1) the
rule affects only the parties to the collective bargaining
agreement, (2) the agreement concerns a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining, and (3) the agreement is the product
of bona fide arm's-length dealing. 14
The court quickly disposed of the first prong, confirming
that the agreement clearly only affected the players and the
teams, who were both parties to the CBA.1 5 The court agreed
that the second prong was also satisfied because the "Rozelle
Rule" constituted a mandatory subject of collective bargaining
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 16 The
NLRA states that mandatory subjects of collective bargaining
include "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment." 7 The court concluded that the rule restricted
the players' ability to move to the highest paying team,
thereby depressing player salaries.1 " Therefore, the
agreement related to "wages" and was a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining. 19
However, the court found that the Rozelle Rule failed the
third prong. 20 In 1968, the year of the first CBA between
then NFL and the National Football League Players
110. See id.
111. See Jones, supra note 29, at 495.
112. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609.
113. See id. at 614.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 615.
116. See id.
117. 29 U.S.C § 158(d) (2006).
118. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
119. See id.
120. See id. at 616.
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Association (NFLPA), the NFLPA was weak'21 and not able to
bargain effectively.'22 The court held that "the 'Rozelle Rule'
was unilaterally imposed by the NFL... upon the players in
1963 and has been imposed on the players from 1963 to the
present date."123  Because there was no arm's-length
bargaining, the non-statutory exemption did not apply.
24
The court conducted a Rule of Reason analysis to conclude
that the Rozelle Rule violated federal antitrust laws.
25
2. The Second Circuit before Clarett: A Different
Approach
The Second Circuit has been active in applying the non-
statutory exception to professional sports cases. The three
cases discussed below set the stage for Second Circuit's
creation of a new standard in Clarett v. NFL.26 The cases
illustrate the Second Circuit's strict observance of federal
labor policy, while avoiding many of the inquiries outlined in
Mackey.
In Wood v. NBA, 27 Leon Wood challenged the salary cap
provision that required teams to sign first round draft picks
to one year, $75,000 contracts if the team had exceeded the
maximum allowable team salary.' 28 Wood, a first round draft
pick of the Philadelphia 76ers, was offered such a contract
after the 76ers exceeded the salary limit. 129 Wood alleged
that the provision violated antitrust laws because it 1)
prevented him from achieving the full market value of his
services,3 0 and 2) impacted players outside the collective
bargaining units.' 3' The court held that it was
inconsequential that Wood was unable to achieve his full
market value because federal labor policy favored
121. The court reiterated that before 1974 the NFLPA was in a relatively
weak bargaining position "due to it recent formation and inadequate finances."
Id. at 615.
122. See id. at 615-16.
123. Id. at 616.
124. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 1976).
125. See id. at 623.
126. See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
127. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
128. See id. at 957, 958.
129. Id. at 958.
130. See id. at 959.
131. See id. at 960.
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unionization and collective bargaining. 132  The court also
rejected Wood's second claim because CBAs often affect
parties not included in the bargaining units. 33
In NBA v. Williams,'34 the NBPA refused to negotiate a
new CBA until the 1988 CBA expired. 13 The NBA sought a
declaration that would allow continued operation of the
league under the 1988 CBA until a new agreement was
reached. 136  The NBPA alleged that continued operation
under the 1988 CBA would violate antitrust laws.'37 The
court rejected the NBPA's arguments, stating that "antitrust
laws have no application to the collective bargaining
negotiations between appellants [players and union] and the
NBA teams."13' The court upheld the lower court's holding
that the non-statutory exemption applied and that "antitrust
immunity exists as long as a collective bargaining
relationship exists." 39
Caldwell v. American Basketball Association140 also
addressed the non-statutory exemption in the professional
sports context. Here, Joe Caldwell, a professional basketball
player, alleged that the NBA teams had collectively agreed to
"blacklist" him from the league in violation of antitrust
laws.' 4 ' The court held that federal labor law required a
specialized agency, the National Labor Relations Board, to
hear such labor related grievances. 4 2 Since Caldwell chose to
bring his claim under the Sherman Antitrust Act, federal
labor policy would be subverted if the court granted relief to
Caldwell.13
The cases above set the stage for the Second Circuit's
decision in Clarett v. NFL. Many think that Clarett's loss in
the Second Circuit prompted the NBA to make a heavy push
for an age requirement.
132. See id. at 959 n.2, 959-60.
133. Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 960 (2d Cir. 1987).
134. NBA v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995).
135. See id. at 686.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 685.
139. Id. at 686.
140. Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass'n, 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995).
141. See id. at 526.
142. See id. at 527.
143. See id. at 530.
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3. Clarett v. NFL: The Non-Statutory Exemption Stuffs
Clarett at the Goal Line
In 2002-2003, Maurice Clarett gained notoriety as one of
the best college football players in the country.14  As the
starting running back for national powerhouse Ohio State
University, he led the Buckeyes to an undefeated season and
a national championship.145 Clarett's success, however, was
soon tarnished by off-the-field problems. In April 2003,
Clarett falsified the price of items that were allegedly stolen
from his automobile and pled guilty for failing to aid a law
enforcement officer. 46  After an NCAA investigation, Ohio
State University suspended Clarett for the 2003 season.'47
Clarett was still one year away from draft eligibility because
the NFL does not allow college athletes to enter the draft
until three years after their high school graduation. 48 The
combination of the suspension and the draft eligibility rule
forced Clarett to sit idle for the 2003 season. 149 Clarett then
decided to challenge the NFL's draft eligibility rules as a
violation of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act.'50
In this suit, the Southern District Court of New York
applied the Mackey three-factor test to determine if the non-
statutory exception applied to the NFL's draft eligibility
rules. 51 The district court found that the NFL did not satisfy
any of the Mackey factors and ruled in favor of Clarett. 1
2
First, the court held that the rule was not a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining because the rule did not make
reference to wages, hours, or conditions of employment. 53
Second, the court held that the draft eligibility rule applied to
parties outside the CBA. The rule clearly affected Clarett,
who was not a part of the bargaining agreement since he was
not yet drafted. 5 4 Finally, the district court held that the
draft eligibility rule was not the subject of bona fide arm's-
144. See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2004).
145. Id. at 126.
146. Cimino, supra note 42, at 847.
147. Id.
148. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 129.
152. See id. at 133.
153. See Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
154. See id. at 395-96.
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length negotiations because the NFL Players Association
(NFLPA) had agreed not to challenge the rule.5
The NFL quickly appealed the decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 15 6 The Second
Circuit rejected the district court's application of the Mackey
test, stating that "it had never regarded the Eighth Circuit's
test in Mackey as defining the appropriate limits of the non-
statutory exception."15 7 Instead the court focused on whether
striking down the draft eligibility rule would "subvert
fundamental principles" of federal labor policy. 5 '
Clarett argued that restricting prospective players from
negotiating directly with NFL teams served as an undue
restraint on the trade of players' skills and, therefore,
violated antitrust laws.159 However, this assertion conflicted
with dominant federal labor policy. 60 The presence of the
NFL players union as the exclusive bargaining representative
dramatically altered Clarett's right to bargain directly with
the teams.161  The court stated that the existence of a
collective bargaining arrangement allows the NFL to "engage
in joint conduct with respect to the terms and conditions of
players' employment as a multi-employer bargaining unit
without risking antitrust liability." 62 Due to the dominant
federal labor policy in favor of unionization and collective
bargaining, the non-statutory exemption preempted Clarett's
antitrust claims. 63
The court then justified its decision by addressing and
refuting Clarett's arguments based on the Mackey test. First,
the court held that the NFL's draft eligibility rules were
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.164 The court
stated that the eligibility rules were comparable to
"conditions for initial employment" and that this alone
constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining.1 65 Recognizing
155. See id. at 396.
156. See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2004).
157. Id. at 133.
158. See id. at 133-37.
159. See id. at 138.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 138 (2d Cir. 2004).
163. See id. at 143.
164. Id. at 139-40.
165. Id. at 139.
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the unusual economic relationships associated with
professional sports, the court found that the rules had
tangible effects on the wages and working conditions of
current players.'66 It also found that the eligibility rules
serve as a form of job security for veteran players. 67
Second, the court quickly disposed of Clarett's argument
that the eligibility rules affect players outside of the union.16
The court found that simply because the rule serves as a
burden to prospective players does not make the rule
objectionable. 69  Moreover, the criteria for employment are
rightly determinable by the NFL and the NFLPA."7 ° The
court compared Clarett to a "typical worker who is confident
that he or she has the skills to fill a job vacancy but does not
possess the qualifications . . . that have been set."' 7' An
employer and a union may decide who will be considered for
employment as long as their decisions do not run afoul of
federal unfair labor practices.7 2
Finally, the court rejected Clarett's contention that the
eligibility rules were not a part of the collective bargaining
process.73 Even though the eligibility rules were not in the
CBA, they were included in the NFL Constitution and its
bylaws, and if the NFLPA had wanted to bargain over them,
they certainly could have. 174 The court also noted that the
waiver provision was included in the CBA, even though the
eligibility provision was not. 75 Thus, since the NFLPA had
the opportunity to bargain over the eligibility provision, even
though they did not, then the provision is considered the
product of an arms length bargain.
4. The Mackey Test v. The Clarett Test: What Is the
Difference?
In Clarett, the Second Circuit created a broader test that
focused on whether the challenged provision comports with
166. Id. at 140.
167. See id.
168. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2004).
169. Id. at 140.
170. See id. at 141.
171. Id.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 142.
174. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 142 (2d Cir. 2004).
175. See id.
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federal labor policy and includes, but is not limited to the
Mackey factors.176 The most significant difference between
the Mackey and Clarett tests is the requirement for bona fide
arm's-length negotiations.'77 In Mackey, this prong is only
satisfied when the parties explicitly bargain over a
provision. 178  In contrast, Clarett applies the non-statutory
exception if it was possible to bargain for the challenged
provision. 1 9 On this basis, the Clarett test is easier to satisfy
than the Mackey test.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM
If a high school player were to challenge Article X as a
violation of antitrust laws, the most significant hurdle the
player must cross is the non-statutory exemption. The NBA
will undoubtedly assert that Article X was collectively
bargained, and, therefore, the non-statutory exemption
precludes any antitrust analysis. However, as shown in
Mackey,' professional athletes have been successful in the
past with antitrust challenges. A challenger could argue that
Article X does not satisfy the three-pronged test in Mackey
and, therefore, the non-statutory exemption should not apply.
The section below will analyze the chances for success of an
antitrust challenge under the more restrictive Mackey test
and the broader Clarett test.
More generally, some have questioned whether the NBA,
a unique labor market, should be treated as the legal
equivalent of more traditional industries. The professional
basketball labor market is inherently different from most
markets because the NBA is the only employer where
basketball players can achieve the full market value of their
unique talents. This fact has led some commentators to
assert that the NBA has an "economic monopoly" on
professional basketball.'8 ' In the 2006-2007, the minimum
salary in the NBA was $412,718,182 and the top pick in the
176. See Jones, supra note 29, at 505.
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 616 (8th Cir. 1976).
181. Clarkson, supra note 19.
182. Inside Hoops, NBA Minimum Salary,
http://www.insidehoops.com/minimum-nba-
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NBA draft will earn $3.6 million.18 3 If a player is forced to
play professionally in another league, he will earn a
significantly lesser salary. In comparison, salaries in
European basketball leagues normally range from $50,000 to
$400,000.114 The average salary in the National Basketball
Developmental League is $35,000, which is 139,000% less
than the average NBA salary.18 5  There is no other
comparable basketball league in the world that pays as much
as the NBA.
The extreme salary disparity creates a unique situation
that is not characteristic of other labor markets. For
example, consider a situation where a steel workers union
agrees to a minimum age limitation with local steel mills. A
steel worker under the age minimum has an acceptable
alternative. He or she can move to a city or region with a
different union that does not have an age restriction. There,
the steel worker can earn a comparable salary. Dissimilarly,
a high school basketball player wanting to enter the NBA
does not have a similar option. He cannot move to another
region or market and earn a similar salary. The fact that
there exists no comparable market to which a potential NBA
player can go lends support to the reasonableness of treating
the NBA labor market differently.
The following section will first discuss whether a
challenge to Article X would be successful under either the
Clarett or the Mackey test. Second, these tests will be
scrutinized to determine whether they lead to equitable
results when applied to the NBA.
IV. ANALYSIS - WOULD A LEGAL CHALLENGE TO ARTICLE X BE
SUCCESSFUL?
A. A Challenge to Article X Would Be Slam Dunked by the
salary.shtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
183. Inside Hoops, NBA Rookie Salaries,
http'//www.insidehoops.com/salaries-rookies.shtml (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
184. See Michael McCann, Illegal Defense: The Irrational Economics of
Banning High School Players From the NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
113, 215 (2004).
185. Posting of Michael McCann, The $35,000 Question: Will Lower NBDL
Age Limit Matter? to Sports Law Blog, http:llsports-
law.blogspot.com/2006/04135000-question-will-lower-nbdl-age.html (Apr. 13,
2006, 18:20 PST).
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Eighth Circuit and Mackey
If a court were to apply the Eighth Circuit test
articulated in Mackey, a challenge to Article X would likely
fail for multiple reasons. First, a court would likely find that
Article X only affects the parties to the collective bargaining
agreement. 8 6 A challenger to Article X would contend that a
high school player wishing to enter the draft is not a party to
the CBA or its negotiations, had no representation at the
bargaining table, and, therefore, the non-statutory exemption
should not apply. The court in Mackey summarily dismissed
this issue because the provision in question only affected the
players and the teams, both parties to the CBA.18 The
Second Circuit in Clarett stated that as long as the union and
employer engage in collective bargaining, it is irrelevant that
the agreement affects parties outside the bargaining unit. 88
Since the NBA players have chosen to unionize and engage in
collective bargaining, the conditions for employment are
decided by the union and the NBA. 8 9 This argument is
strengthened further by the statutory language in the NLRA,
which defines "employee" in a manner so as to include people
other than those working in the bargaining unit.' 9° Therefore,
a challenger's argument under this prong will most likely fail.
Second, a court will likely conclude that Article X
concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
According to the NLRA, mandatory subjects include wages,
hours, and working conditions.' 91 In analyzing this prong, the
Mackey court looked not only to the form of the agreement,
but also to its practical effect.'92 In Mackey, while the Rozelle
Rule dealt only with compensation among teams, the effect of
the rule was to restrict player movement to other teams and
consequently, to depress player salaries.' 93 Likewise, in
Clarett, the appeals court held that the draft eligibility rules
had an effect on the NFL salary cap and the minimum salary
186. See Jones, supra note 29, at 509.
187. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615.
188. See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2004).
189. Id.
190. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006).
191. See id. § 158(d).
192. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
193. See id.
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for rookies.194 Similarly, Article X is tied to the NBA salary
cap because the CBA enumerates mandatory salaries for the
first three years of a player's career based on the player's
draft position.195 Therefore, Article X will likely be construed
as affecting "wages"-a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining. Hence, a challenger would lose under this prong.
Finally, a court will certainly determine that Article X
was the subject of bona fide arm's-length negotiations. Prior
to 2005, NBA Commissioner David Stern was quite vocal in
his desire to implement an age requirement. 196 The media
widely reported that Stern was vigorously advocating for a
twenty year-old age limit.197 The fact that the parties
eventually agreed to a nineteen year old age requirement
indicates that this provision was the subject of intense
bargaining. Hence, a challenger would likely not satisfy this
prong, and would likely not succeed under the Mackey test.
B. A Challenge to Article X Would Be Sacked by the Second
Circuit and Clarett
A challenge to the NBA age requirement would
immediately start out on bad footing under Clarett. The
Clarett court initially focused on the dominant federal labor
policy in favor of unionization and collective bargaining.
1 98
Since the NBA players have unionized under the NBPA, and
because the NBA and NBPA have engaged in collective
bargaining for many years, a court applying Clarett would
lean in favor of applying the non-statutory exception to
Article X. Since the first two prongs are identical to the
Mackey test, 99 a court will apply them in the same way
described in the preceding section and determine that both
prongs are satisfied. The expansive third prong in Clarett
would only require the possibility of bargaining between the
NBA and NBPA over Article X.200  Given that the age
194. See Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2004).
195. See NBA Player's Association, Rookie Scale, Art. VIII, available at
http://www.nbpa.com/cba-articles/article-VIII.php.
196. See Selena Roberts, Stern Questions the Outrage Over Early Entry to
N.B.A., N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1996, at C4.
197. See Jones, supra note 29, at 510.
198. See Clarett, 369 F.3d at 133-37.
199. See Jones, supra note 29, at 509.
200. Id.
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requirement was a hotly debated topic, it is likely that it
resulted from arms length bargaining. Therefore, a challenger
would not satisfy this prong.
Unfortunately for high school players like Bill Walker, a
legal challenge to Article X is unlikely to succeed given the
current state of the law. A court looking to the Second and
Eighth Circuits for guidance will almost certainly apply the
non-statutory exemption to preclude antitrust analysis.
However, the Clarett and Mackey decisions represent the
opinions of only two circuits on this issue.2°' Seeing as the
trial court initially ruled in favor of Mr. Clarett, °2 another
circuit may likewise disagree if presented with a challenge to
Article X.2°3
The next section will explain various criticisms of the
Clarett and Mackey tests and will propose a slightly different
approach fashioned in an effort to reach a more equitable
outcome.
V. PROPOSAL
A. Special Treatment for Professional Sports: Why Not?
In Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., the Supreme Court
refused to treat professional athletes as "special" when it
came to antitrust analysis.0 4 However, professional athletes
may have a good argument to be treated as legally "special" in
antitrust analysis because of their uniquely high earning
potential and the limited number of employers.
Just what special treatment the NBA should receive is a
difficult question. Given that the Clarett court focused on the
three-part test articulated in Mackey, the most appropriate
solution is to revise this test to resolve its inherent inequity
when applied to the NBA.
B. Problems with the Prongs
While the three-prong test reflects the appropriate focus
of the non-statutory exemption, arguably, it is being applied
in an overly expansive manner. The suggestions below call
201. See Clarkson, supra note 19.
202. See Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 393-97 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
203. Id.
204. Brown, 518 U.S. at 248-50.
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for (1) a stricter interpretation of the "wages" prong of the
Mackey and Clarett test and (2) high school players to not be
considered "parties" to the CBA.
1. Make "Wages" Actually Mean "Wages"
In analyzing whether a challenged provision constitutes a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, a court must
determine if the provision relates to wages, hours, or
conditions of employment. °5 In Clarett, the court used a
series of inferences to conclude that the NFL eligibility rule
was tied to wage conditions. For Article X, proponents argue
that the age limit restricts the number of players available to
play in the NBA, and therefore keeps veteran players
employed and their wages high. 20 6 Furthermore, they assert
that rookies are subject to a rookie salary scale, which in turn
affects the salary cap. 207 These effects on wages, proponents
contend, are sufficient to make Article X a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining. °s
However, these specific assertions stretch the effects of
Article X to an illogical extreme. First, Article X will not limit
the number of players available to play in the NBA. Even
though NBA teams are not able to draft players directly from
high school, they will still draft someone. There are many
players in college or overseas who are talented enough to earn
a shot to play in the NBA. Article X will not decrease the
number of players in the league; it only means that teams
will draft players from a different source. Hence, there is no
effect on wages. Second, it is irrelevant that rookies are
subject to a rookie salary scale. As described, the league will
have the same amount of rookies under Article X as the old
eligibility rule. Article X has no effect whatsoever on the
salary cap, and therefore, should not be interpreted as a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
More generally, under the existing analysis, courts can
make any provision somehow relate to wages. For example, a
provision that requires players to wear headbands may
increase demand for headbands, which would in turn lead to
205. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
206. Jones, supra note 29, at 512-13.
207. Id. at 513.
208. Id.
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increased headband sales, which would in turn lead to
increased revenue for the teams, which would lead to an
increase in player salaries. Thus, it appears that courts could
manufacture an attenuated affect on wages to satisfy the
Mackey and Clarett standards. This kind of judicial juggling
is ill suited for such an important legal question.
The easiest solution to this problem is to restrict the
expansive interpretation of "wages," "hours," and "conditions"
and require a challenged provision to truly concern wages,
hours, or conditions of employment. The non-statutory
exemption is a powerful tool because it precludes antitrust
analysis. The effect of a broad interpretation of the non-
statutory exemption serves as an easy out for many practices
that have significant anticompetitive effects. Requiring a
narrower interpretation of what constitutes a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining will ensure that the non-
statutory analysis is not a moot exercise.
2. High School Players Should Not Be Considered Parties
to the CBA Since They Have Not Yet Entered the League
The courts have taken an expansive view on who is
considered a "party" to collective bargaining agreements. 209
In Clarett, the court held that Clarett was a party to the CBA
because his interests were represented by the NFL players
union.210 However, this assertion is illogical and unjust to
prospective players. In reality, the immediate duty of the
NBPA is to the current players in the league. They have the
duty to bargain for the best wages and conditions for those
currently in the league. Prospective players have an interest
in entering the league, which would serve to push some
current players out of the league. This creates the following
question: Should current players, who have a significant
stake in preserving jobs for themselves, have the right to
collectively bargain away the employment rights of
prospective players who are not represented at the bargaining
table?211 It seems inevitable that the NBPA would sacrifice
the interests of prospective players in favor of current and
209. See id. at 511.
210. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2004).
211. See Michael A. McCann, Legality of Age Restrictions in the NBA and the
NFL, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 757 (2006).
20081 705
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
veteran players. It appears that this is exactly what
happened when the NBPA agreed to include Article X in the
CBA.
A possible solution to this problem is a stricter
interpretation of who is considered a "party" to the CBA
under the MackeyIClarett tests. As stated above, it is
irrational to think that the NBPA is bargaining to protect the
interests of prospective players when their immediate concern
must be the welfare of those players already in the league.2 12
If a court were to hold that high school players are not parties
to the CBA, the non-statutory exemption would not apply, as
this prong of the Mackey! Clarett test would not be satisfied.
This strict interpretation would cause the NBA age
requirement to be subjected to the more rigorous antitrust
analysis. While not the subject of this paper, under antitrust
law, the age requirement could be considered a "group
boycott, '213  which is impermissible because of its
anticompetitive effects. A strict construction of who is
considered a party to the CBA is more desirable because it
better reflects the realities of collective bargaining and would
lead to more equitable results.
VI. CONCLUSION
As Bill Walker limped around the campus of Kansas
State University, he undoubtedly wondered how his future
would have progressed if Article X was not passed. Instead of
eating crusty hamburgers from the cafeteria, he would be
eating filet mignon at a first class restaurant. Instead of
riding across campus on a bicycle, he would be driving a
Mercedes Benz. Hopefully Walker will be able to recover
from his injury and return to his previous form, but it is very
possible that the injury might cost him his shot at the NBA.21 4
212. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
213. Clarkson, supra note 19, at 1 (quoting Michael McCann, Miss. College
Sch. of Law). A group boycott is an agreement among competitors not to deal
with another person or business unless the latter refrains from doing business
with an actual or potential competitor of the boycotters. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
214. Luckily, Walker has seemed to fully recover from his injury. He has
appeared to regain some of his explosiveness as he is averaging sixteen points
per game and 6.3 rebounds per game thus far during the 2007-2008 basketball
season. Kansas State Wildcats - Bill Walker, ESPN.COM,
http'//sports.espn.go.com/ncb/player/profile?playerld=34658 (last visited Feb.
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Many boast that Article X is beneficial for the league, its fans,
and its players, but Article X is a dangerous roll of the dice for
high school players like Walker. Unfortunately, a challenge
to Article X would likely fail given the precedent in the
Second and Eighth Circuits, but hopefully another circuit will
see the NBA and Article X differently. If not, then we might
miss out on the next basketball phenom. Can you imagine
the NBA without LeBron James and Kobe Bryant? I sure
cannot.
15,2008).
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